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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF QUESTIONING BAR
APPLICANTS AS TO POLITICAL BELIEFS
One of the most vexatious problems confronting modem jurists
has been brought into sharp focus in the past decade i. e., the
right of the government to search the minds of men to ascertain
their political beliefs. This controversial issue has been manifest
in the areas of congressional investigation, labor union manage-
ment, public employment and employment in "sensitive" areas
both in and out of government. Ironically enough the problem of
inquiry into political affiliations has also come to haunt the courts,
and the legal profession in general, in their own "backyard", name-
ly in proceedings for admission to the bar.
The great mass of litigation in this field has resulted in the crys-
tallization of two dilemmas., The first, must the right of inquiry
into political beliefs render the government too strong for the
liberties of its people, or, the absence of that right render the gov-
ernment too weak to maintain its own existence? The second is
one which runs true in every field of the law; the desire for cer-
tainty in legal principles on the one hand, and the desire for justice
in the individual case on the other.
What about the states' inquiries into political beliefs and affili-
ations? Are they a violation of the first amendment freedoms of
speech, thought, conscience, etc., as they are embodied in the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constituion? Are such in-
quiries ever relevant to the determination of fitness to practice law?
And if so, what are the limitations on this right of inquiry into the
political beliefs of an applicant? Assuming that said inquiries are
constitutional and relevant, would there, in fact, be any protection
against arbitrary and discriminatory use of that right in view of
each state's near absolute power to determine membership in its
barl' It is hoped that this article will contribute to the better un-
derstanding of and the ability to cope with the complex principles
inherent ii these questions.
In all states the moral character and general fitness of applicants
for the bar must be approved prior to their admission to practice."
The majority of states provide for a character investigation of ap-
plicants either by the bar examining board or by a separate char-
1. Comment, Current Limitations on Governmental Invasion of Firt Amendment Free-
doms, 13 Ohio St. L. J. 237, (1952).
2. Rules for Admission to the Bar (West Publishing Co., 1957).
[VoL. 34
1958] NOTES 151
acter committee.' The board or committee, in its investigation,
may inquire into any matter that is relevant to the determination
of the applicant's character and general fitness for the practice of
law.4 The applicant is required to disclose any relevant matter,
such as a prior conviction or indictment,- previous disbarment for
professional misconduct,6 or personal misconduct which affects his
fitness to practice.
7
The recommendation made by the character committee or ex-
amining board on the basis of its inquiry is subject to judicial re-
view, but it is usually considered to be conclusive in the absence
of a clear abuse of discretioT1.8 It should be noted that prior to the
case of In re Summers9 there was no recognition of a federally
protested guarantee of due process in state bar admission proceed-
ings. But in the Summers case the Court held that, a claim of a
present right to admission to the bar of a state and a denial of that
right is a controversy which may be reviewed when federal ques-
tions are raised.'0
In a number of states an inquiry into the applicant's loyalty is
included as part of the character investigation.11 Courts have held
that an individual may be denied admission to the bar 2 or dis-
3. For a full listing of the various character -requirements and investigative proced-
ures, See Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20 Fordham L. Rev.
305, (1951).
4. In re Stepsay, 15 Cal. 2d 71, 98 P.2d 489 (1940). (The inquiry into the moral
character of the applicants for admission is broader in scope than in a disbarment pro-
ceeding.).
5. Spears v. State Bar of California, 211 Cal. 183, 294 Pac. 697 (1930) (forgery);
People v. Mead, 29 Colo. 344, 68 Pac. 241 (1902) (embezzlement); Grievance Comm.
of Hartford Bar v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 At. 292 (1930) (adultery); People ex rel.
Healy v. McCauley, 230 Ill. 208, 82 N.E. 612 (1907) (extortion); In re West, 212 N.C.
189, 193 S.E. 134 (1937) (fraud); In re Ulmer, 208 Fed. 461 (N.D. Ohio 1913)
(perjury).
6. In re Mash, 28 Cal. App. 692, 153 Pac. 961 (1915); State Bar v. Riccardi, 53
Nev. 128, 294 Pac. 537 (1931).
7. In re Wells, 36 Cal. App. 785, 172 Pac. 93 (1918); In re Moshkow, 250 App.
Div. 780, 294 N.Y. Supp. 474 (2d Dep't 1937).
8. To show abuse of discretion the applicant would probably have to prove prejudice
on the part of the examiners, lack of fair procedure during inquiry, or a decision mani-
festly contrary to the evidence. See, e.g., Higgins v. Hartford County Bar, 111 Conn. 47,
149 Atl. 415 (1930); In re Frank, 293 Ill. 263, 127 N.E. 640 (1920); In re Hughey
62 Nev. 498, 156 P.2d 733 (1945); Application of Stone, 74 Wyo. 389, 288 P.2d 767
(1955); In re Latimer, 11 fH.2d 327, 143 N.E.2d 20 (1957).
9. 325 U. S. 561 (1945); cf. Bradwell v. Ill., 16 Wall. 130 (1872) (Exclusion of
female applicant not a denial of privilege and immunities under the fourteenth amend-
ment).
10.. 325 U. S. 561, 568 (1945) The case exemplifies the attitude of the United States
Supreme Court of allowing the states full rein over the interpretation of requisite moral
standards as well as over admissions generally.
11. tot a comprehensive survey of the actual inquiries made by bar committees dur-
ing their character investigation of applicants, See Brown and Fassett, Loyalty Tests for
Admission to the Bar, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 480 (1953).
12. Application of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y. S.2d 202 (2d dep't 1944),
aff'd, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947) (Member of Christian Front denied admis-
sion for advocating the unlawful use of force against subversive elements).
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barred from practice 13 because of his participation in an organiza-
tion which advocates the use of unlawful force to effectuate social
change.
Until recently it had not been determined whether mere mem-
bershipi  the Communist Party would disqualify the individual
for the practice of law, as the courts have based their earlier decis-
ions on the overt activity of the person involved. 14 However, in
the case of Schware v. Board. of Bar Examiners5 the Supreme
Court held that the petitioner's past membership in the Commu-
nist Party did not justify an inference that he presently has bad
moral character. In view of the Communist Control Act of 1954
which stripped the Communist Party of any of the rights of recog-
nized political parties it is doubtful that present membership could
be considered innocent.16
The questions of (a) past or present membership in the Com-
munist Party as grounds for denying an individual his chosen pro-
fession and (b) whether. or not an individual can be required to
disclose his political affiliations or beliefs in answer to an inquiry
by the bar authorities have reached the courts twice in the last
three years.' 7
The Supreme Court of the United States, in In re Anastaplo, s
left in effect an Illinois ruling that the Committee on Character
and Fitness may legitimately question applicants for admission to
the Illinois Bar about membership in the Communist Party or in
any other subversive organization on the list compiled by the
United States Department of Justice. The Illinois Court had held
that such questions were relevant to the determination of good
13. Margolis's Case, 269 Pa. 206, 112 AtI. 478 (1921) (disbarment for advocating
anarchism and obstructing the draft); In re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925)
(disbarment for sympathetically addressing the I.W.W.); But cf., In re Clifton, 33 Idaho
614, 196 Pac. 670 (1921) (disloyal statements made by attorney not ground for dis-
harment).
14. See Brown and Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev.
480, 495 (1953).
15. 353 U.S. 232, 245 (1957) The Court went on to say, "Assuming that some
members of the Communist Party during the period from 1932 to 1940 had illegal aims
and engaged in illegal activities, it cannot automatically be inferred that all members
shared their evil purposes or participated in their illegal conduct."; Wiemaan v. Upde-
grafil, 344 U. S. 183, 191 (1952) The Court further reiterated, "Indiscriminate classifi-
cation of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power."
See also Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 136 (1943) where the Court said,
... under our traditions beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere association, and
that men in adhering to a political party or other organization notoriously do not sub-
scribe unqualifiedly to all its platforms or asserted principles."
16. See Communist Control Act, 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 841 (Supp. IV,
1957). See also, Note, Membership in or Affiliation with the Communist Party as Grounds
for Disbarment, 26 Notre Dame Law. 498 (1951) which covers the subject of exclusion
as well as disbarment.
17. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill.2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
946 (1955); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
18.' In re Anastaplo, supra note 17.
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citizenship of an applicant and his ability to take the oath19 of a
lawyer in good conscience, and that a refusal to answer them was
a basis for the denial of a certificate to practice law."
In this case, the record of the applicant was above reproach.21
In the questionnaire submitted along with his application he stated
without mental reservation that he supported and in the future
would continue to support the Constitution of the United States
and the state of Illinois. However the panel, and later the full
committee, questioned the applicant about his views regarding the
desirability of allowing Communists to practice law and inquired
into his beliefs in the right of revolution. When the applicant re-
plied that be believed that members of the Communist Party, if
otherwise qualified, should be admitted to the bar and that the
right to revolt by force of arms, if necessary, is an inherent and
traditional American political theory as embodied in the Declara-
tion of Independence, the panel and the committee proceeded to
question him about his political affiliations and about the news-
papers to which he subscribed. The refusal of the applicant to
answer these questions, a refusal based on the first and fourteenth
amendments (not on the plea of self-incrimination), prompted.
the Committee to deny his application. 2
It would appear that it was because of his answers concerning
the right to revolution and the right of a Communist to practice
law, that the applicant was asked about his political affiliations.
This point might well be important in considering whether the
inquiry into his political affiliations was constitutional and relevant.
To be contrasted with In re Anastaplo is the case of Konigs-
19. Il. Rev. Stat. c.13, 1 4 (1895) (Applicant is required to take a statutory oath
to support the Constitutions of the United States and Illinois.).
20. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill.2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954).
21. See London, Heresy and the Illinois Bar; the Application of George Anastaplo for
Admission, 12 Law. Guild Rev. 163 (1952) (Mr. Anastaplo served in World War II as
an officer in the United States Air Force, in the Pacific, European and Middle Eastern
Theatres. His character references were from a former mayor of his home town, a United
States Congressman, a newspaper editor, and several law professors and former teachers.
One of these teachers said: "He was one of the two most brilliant minds I have ever
taught. His moral standards are impregnable." Another referred to him as being . . .
"alert at once to the special resonpsibilities and potentialities of the law and of its
function in American society. His devotion to the deepest American moral and political
principles is beyond question.").
22. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill.2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954); Compare, In re Sum-
mers, 325 U. S. 561 (1944) where the Court had been faced with a related problem in-
volving admission to the Illinois Bar. (In that case the action of the Illinois Court. in
refusing to admit the applicant (conscientious objector), was upheld in a 5 to 4 de-
cision. The denial of admission was based upon the applicant's insistence on a qualifi-
cation of the oath to the effect that he would not employ force to support the CQnsti-
tution.) The instant case poses substantially the same issue, since the applicant's ex-
pressed belief in the "right to revolution" is similarly a conscientious objection that is
inconsistent with the taking of an unqualified oath. Thus both cases uphold exclusion
from membership in the bar based upon the ground that the oath, if taken, would not
be in good faith.
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berg v. The State of California.2 3 In that instance the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the California
Court which had affirmed the action of the State Bar Examiners in
refusing to certify the petitioner to practice law. They had denied
him admission on the grounds that he had (1) failed to prove
that he -was of good moral character and (2) failed to prove
that he did not advocate the overthrow of the governments of the
United states and California by unconstitutional means.24
The Court examined (1) the testimony of an ex-Communist
who had testified that Konigsberg had attended party-unit meet-
.ings in 1941; (2) his public criticism, in an editorial, of American
foreign and domestic policy and of certain public officials; and
'(3) his refusal to answer questions as to political affiliations.2 1
They held, in a four to three decision, that there was no evidence
in the record which rationally justified a finding that the petitioner
had failed to satisfy the above two requirements of good' moral
'character and non-advocacy to overthrow the governments even
though he refused to answer questions as to his political associ-
ations.26
It should be noted that there was no indication, in the eyes of
the majority of the Court, that the denial of admission to the bar
by the State Bar Examiners had been based solely on a refusal to
answer; 27 they found it unnecessary to decide whether such an
independent ground for exclusion would be constitutional.28 In
effect the Court has said that California's refusal to admit the peti-
tioner is a denial of due process and of equal protection of the
laws because it is both arbitrary and discriminatory. -2 9
23. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
24. California Business and Professions' Code, 1937. ,.§ 6060 (c) requires that an
applicant must have "good moral character" before he can" be certified:. 6064.1 provides
that no person "who advocates the overthrow, of the Govermnent of the United States or
of this State by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means, 'shall be certified to the
Supreme Court for admission and a license'to practice' law."
25. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 266 (1957).
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 259 and n.12.
28. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252, 261 (dictum)' "Serious
questions of elemental fairness would be raised' if the committee had excluded Konigsberg
simply because he failed to answer questions without first explicitly warning him that he
could be barred for this reason alone . . ." "If it were possible for us to say that 'the
board had barred Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to respond to its inqiries into
his political associations . . . then we would be compelled, to decide far, reaching' and
complex questions relating to free'onM of speech, _press and assembly." "if and when 'a
state makes a failure to answer .a question an independent' ground for extlusion from the
bar, then this Court, as the cases arise, will: have to detbrsmine whether" the exclusion is
constitutionally permissible."
29. Id at 262. See Schware v. Board of"Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248-249
(1957) (concurring opinion) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter. emphasized that it was not the
Supreme Court's business to substitute its judgment for that of a state, nor was the
Court an "overseer of a particular result" of any state's procedure for admission to the
bar. "But judicial action, even in an individual case, may have been based on 'avowed
[Vo,.- 34
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In a dissenting opinion,1° Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr.
Justice Clark, vigorously attacked the majority's approach to the
"refusal-to-answer" issue. The dissenters were of the opinion that
the majority by not holding that the matter inquired into was
privileged, yet upholding the refusal to answer, imposed their own
notions of public policy in a matter of state concern. They felt
that it :was beyond question that a state may refuse admission to
an applicant who refuses to answer questions relevant to his quali-
fications if such questions do not invade a constitutionally privil-
eged area.In summing up the Konigsberg decision, limiting the review to
the "refusal-to-answer" aspect of the case, the holding indicates
that the inquiries into the applicant's political affiliations were not
relevant to a determination of his fitness to practice law. Therefore
his refusal to answer was deemed no basis for denying admission.
The Court refused to consider whether such inquiry could ever be
relevant to a determination of an applicant's fitness so as to render
a refusal to answer a basis for denial of admission. In effect, the
Court carefully avoided ruling that the petitioner's refusal to ans-
wer was or was not privileged under the first and fourteenth
amendments.
In comparing the two principal cases of In re Anastaplo and
Konigsberg v. The State Bar of California, it would appear that
two very similar situations resulted in directly opposite decisions.
In re Anastaplo produced a denial of. admission to the bar for a
refusal to answer questions concerning political affiliations. Yet,
in Konigsberg v. The State Bar of California, the Supreme Court
reversed a denial of admission and held that there was no evidence
to justify exclusion even though the petitioner refused to answer
considerations that are inadmissible in that they violate the requirements of due process.
Refusal to allow a man to qualify himself for the profession on a wholly arbitrary standard
or on consideration that offends the dictates of reason offends the Due Process Clause.").
30. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353- .US. 252, 276 (1957) (dissenting
opinion) (The dissenters argued that what the state has done was to say that the
petitioner's refusal to cooperate in answering relevant questions had "made it impos-
sible to proceed to an affirmative certification that he. was qualified---i. e., that his refusal
placed him in a position where he must be deemed-to have failed to sustain his burden
of proof.. Whether the state was justified in doing this under .the Fourteenth Ameidment
is the sole issue before us
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the dissenters, went on to say, "... it seems to me
altogether beyond question that a state may refuse admission to its bar to an applicant,
no matter how sincere, who refuses to answer questions which are reasonably relevant to
his qualifications and which do not invade a constitutionally privileged arem." He said,
"For me, it would at least be more understandable if the Court were to hold that the
Committee's questions called for matter privileged under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
merts. But the Court carefully avoids doing so." "What the Court has really done, I
think, is simply to impose on California its own notions of public policy and judgment."
In the dissenters' view the decision represented an unacceptable intrusion into a matter
of state concern.).
1958]
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questions as to political affiliations. What is the all important dis-
tinction?
The implication seems to be that, in the former case, an in-
quiry into Mr. Anastaplo's political affiliations was deemed rele-
vant and proper because his statements professing the "right to
revolt" and the "right of a Communist to practice Law" raised a.
substantial doubt as to his present loyalty and his ability to take
the lawyers' oath in good faith. In the latter case such an inquiry
was deemed irrelevant and improper because there was no evi-
dence which could be said to have raised a substantial doubt as
to Mr. Konigsberg's present loyalty-the existing evidence"1 hav-
ing pointed to a past Communist Party affiliation,- 2 if any.
In neither case was there a specific ruling by the Supreme Court
of the United States on the constitutional issue, i.e. Can a state in-
quire into the political affiliations of bar applicants? No test was set
out for determining when such injury will be held constitutional and
when unconstitutional with respect to the freedoms guaranteed by
the first and fourteenth amendments. An analysis of the cases and
vast amount of material on this subject reveals, however, the legal
processes utilized by the Supreme Court in deciding each individual
case.
It was said in the case of American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds"3 that government's "interest in the character of members
of the bar, Re Summers,34 325 U.S. 561 (1945), sometimes admit
of limitations upon rights set out in the First Amendment". The
question is, when are these limitations justified? A hint is given
in the Douds case as to the test applied when, in further analy-
zing the Summers decision, the Court observed that the relation
between the obligations of membership in the bar and service re-
quired by the state in time of war, the limited eflect of the state's
holding upon speech and assembly, and the strong interest which
every state court has in the persons who become officers of the
court..are sufficient to justify the state action.35
The latter statement exemplifies the Court's current trend to
swing away from the strict test of "clear and present danger" to
the "balancing of the interests" test in first amendment cases in-
31. See Konigsberg v, State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 266 (1957) (testimony
of one ex-Communist; editorials; refusal to answer).
32. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners. 353 U. S. 232 (1957) (Past membership it,
Communist Party does not justify an inference of present bad moral character).
33. 339 U.S. 382, 398 (1950).
34. See note 22 supra.
35. American Communications As'n. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 405 (1950).
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volving pure civil liberties situations.36 The "balancing of the in-
terests" test holds that, after a finding of a factual invasion of
first amendment freedoms, the individual interest side is weighed
by considering the nature of the aspect invaded, the magnitude of
the invasion, and the appropriateness of the invasion. Then the
Court' decides whether or not there is a factual public interest by
determining if the governmental action has a constitutionally per-
mitted objective. If it has, the public interest side is weighed by
a consideration of the substantive importance of the objective, the
nexus between that objective' and the governmental action, and
the basis used to establish the nexus. If the individual interest
side weighs the heaviest, the governmental action is unconsititu-
tional; if the public interest side weighs heaviest, governmental
action is constitutional.
: 
7
In a hypothetical application of this "balancing of the interests"
theory let us assume that there is very substantial evidence that an
individual applying for admission to the bar is presently a member
of the Communist Party. After an inquiry by the state and a re-
fusal to answer by the applicant, he is denied admission solely on
the ground that he refused to answer what was deemed to be a
relevant inquiry into his fitness to practice law.
On the individual'interest side of the scale there is a factual
invasion of first amendent freedoms i. e., an exclusion from the bar
for refusing to answer has the effect of discouraging the expres-
sion of political rights protected thereunder. Next the Court
would consider the magnitude of the invasion in order to weigh
the individual interest invaded. It could be said that the effect of
the state's action on the individual's exercise of this freedom would
* be slight since he could continue to hold his beliefs and principles
so long as he did not practice law. Finally, the appropriateness of
the invasion and permissibility of the government's objective might
be affirmed on the basis of the Communist Control Act of 1954
(establishing a factual public interest).
Weighing the public interest side, the inquiry is designed to dis-
cover and exclude persons who advocate world revolution.: and the
use of the practice of law as a weapon to abuse the courts,*-ridicule
justice,3 destroy the very constitutional. liberties sought to be
36. See Comment, Current Limitations on Governmental Invasion of First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 13 Ohio St. L. J. 237 (1952) for a complete analysis
37. Id at 264.
38. A recent example of inteference with judicial proceedings was the ordeal of Judge
Medina in the trial of the. eleven Communists' Urited Staites" v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1950), for violation of the Smith Act, 18 U: S. C' j235 (Supp. 1950). The defense
attorneys made little effort to exonerate their clients-the sole purpose of the trial was to
1958] NomF_
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preserved and to eventually extinguish democracy itself. A reason-
able nexus exists between the objective and the action taken (in-
quiry into political beliefs) and the nexus is established on a class
basis. The Court might rationally find that the Communist is not
like other lawyers in his utilization of the courts in our system.
In the "balancing" process one could decide that, because the in-
vasion by the state's action was slight in terms of magnitude, the
important objective of the state would override the invasion even
though there was only a reasonable nexus established on a class
basis. Comparing this hypothetical situation with an actual case,
the Court said in the Douds case that "When the effect of a statute
or ordinance upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms is
relatively small and the public interest to be protected is substan-
tial it is obvious that a rigid test requiring a showing of imminent
danger to the security of the nation is an absurdity."39
The shift to the "balancing of the interests" test reminds us that
the Constitution is a substantially different document from the one
which was accepted by the original thirteen states. As the needs
of the nation have shifted, and will perpetually continue to shift,
certain of the basic principles which then existed have been en-
croached upon and face further alteration to meet those needs. If
this were not true, the country could,. one day, find itself barren of.
all fundamental rights. This being so, the few who wish to keep
their precious silence must suffer an inconvenience of benefit to
the majority so that the majority, as well as the few, may continue
to enjoy the degree of freedom they now possess.
The cases substantiate this discussion. Thus, while it is con-
ceded that.an inquiry into an applicant's.:political affiliations ordi-
narily would be irrelevant,4° an inquiry .regarding an applicant's
present membership in the Communist Party, whose conspiratorial
purpose is well recognized,"' would appear to be particularly rele-
make a mockery of American justice. These lawyers heaped abuse upon the United States,
the Constitution, and its officers, and made repeated efforts to fill the record with error
so that the case would go through repeated appeals and be kept in the eyes of the prblIc.
The Communists who were being tried were to be martyrs'for the party.
39. American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 397 (1950 - - -
40. See West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 824, 642 (1943)
where Mr. Justice Jackson stated, !If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constel-
lation it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein." to c b o
41. See Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion 'in American 'Communications Ass'n. v:. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 424 (1950), wherg the Communist:Party.is charcte ized as..a "revolu-
tionary junta" -whose purposes .fie-f6eign to ..our. constitskonal .s4qesp.of overnmont.
See also, Communist Control Act, 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 5.0U.i.,.',41 (Rvm "v,
1957). " .. .. .
[VoL. 34.
vant to the determination of his fitness to practice law.42 In this
connection anapplicant expounded at great length, in Martin v.
Law Society of British Columbia,'4  upon freedom of expression,
freedom of thought, freedom of the individual, and the protection
of minorities arguing that he should not be denied the "right" to
practice law. And the court said: "How these 'freedoms' can be
invoked on behalf of an avowed Communist to place him in a
position where he could more effectively destroy them, is a para-
dox. But this type of paradox is consistent with the Communist
plan of infiltration which disclosures in the United States in par-
ticular have made a matter of common knowledge in our day.'
However, a conclusion that a present day Communist should be
denied admission to the bar does not justify inquiry into the poli-
tical beliefs and affiliations of all applicants. It would seem more
consistent with our theory of government to assume that candi-
dates for membership in the bar are presently loyal, and therefore
not to be subjected to such inquiry unless substantial competent
evidence to the contrary is obtained." But once such evidence
does raise a bona fide doubt as to present loyalty, inquiry becomes
relevant and should not be defeated by the .applicant invoking his
rights of free speech, free thought and freedom to follow the dic-
tates of his conscience, under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Furthermore, disclosures of past membership in the Communist
Party,46 past membership in an organization on the Attorney Gen-
eral's list 47 or of other facts in connection with loyalty would not
necessarily result in denial of admission to the bar. The recent
cases 8 certainly illustrate the protection afforded an applicant
against arbitrary and discriminatory exclusion.
42. The American Bar Association has recommended that each state require each
member of the bar to file an affidavit stating whether he is, or ever has been, a member
of an organization supporting the overthrow of the government by unconstitutional means.
Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 36 A.B.A.J. 948, 972 (1950).
43. 3 D.L.R. 173 (B. C. Ct. of App. 1950).
44". Id at 179.
45. Cf. Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, 101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 480, 482
n.5 (1953).
46. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). A person may
have joined to obtain social reforms--depression ea; or to help defeat Facism-war years.
47. Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (The Supreme Court decided
that the "Oath of Allegiance" demanded of all public employees in Oklahoma was un-
constitutional because it was impossible for the employee to show that his membership in
a subversive organization had been an innocent one. The Court then stated that to bar
a candidate for office or a civil servant or teacher because of an affiliation maintained in
reasonable ignorance of the purpose and aims of the organization would be a denial of
due process, and that this requirement of knowledge had been established in three other
loyalty cases: Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of
Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56
(1951).
48. See, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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The practice of law depends on high moral character and legal
training. The state bar is allowed great autonomy in determining
moral fitness, and its determination will be sustained despite an
incidental impingement of .freedom of religion, speech, belief, or
political affiliation. Because of the high standing of lawyers in the
community, the vital nature of the administration of justice, and
the ability of a few to bring justice into disrepute, the argument is
strong that a state can .inquire into political affiliations to protect
itself from subversion of such an important function. In the case
of Communists it has been convincingly demonstrated that they
will take advantage of positions of trust and confidence to advance
their cause i. e., the destruction of free institutions; therefore the
courts, through their inherent powers, should be entitled to pro-
tect themselves from internal enemies by denying Communists ad-
mission to or continuance in the practice of law.
JOHN P. CRAVEN.
THE SMALL LOAN PROBLEM IN NORTH DAKOTA
In a recent decision' the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld
the granting of an injunction and appointment of a receivership
against the Peerless Finance Company of Fargo. In the complaint
filed by the state it was alleged that the loan company was guilty
of gross violations of the usury laws 2 in lending small amounts of
money at interest rates ranging from 149 to 277 percent per annum.
This case graphically illustrates the existence of the "loan shark"
problem in North Dakota.3 Vsury and the plight of the small
debtor is a problem as old as the recorded history of man.4 HOW-
ever, the advent of the industrial revolution and the formation of
modern capitalism fathered the loan shark as he exists, today.. It is
easy to see that when men lived upon the soil their outside needs
were relatively few, but with the coming of the machine age this
independence was lost and the family became dependent on. a pay
slip and a money economy.
In America the populous states and the industrial centers were
1. State ex rel. Burgum v..Hooker, 87 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1957).
2. N. D. Rev. Code J1 47-1409, 47-1410, 47-1411 (1943).
3. The vicious term. "loan 'sh ark'- has -been somewhat mildly defined by one author
as follows: "A loan shark is ode who lends comparatively small sums of money as a
business, at high and almost always illegal rates of charge under conditions which de-
fraud and oppress the borrower:" Hubabhek, The Dmwlopmes of Regulatory Ssall .Lan
Laws, 8 Law & Contemp.
. .
Prob. 108 (1941).
4. .Deuteronomy XXIII, 19, 20; Hailtos, In Re The Small Debtor, 42 Yale L.J.
473 (1933).
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